

AD/RR

3 October 1955

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**Comments on Statement of CIA Position Concerning Exchanges of
Persons and Travel to the USSR**

REFERENCE: Draft Statement of CIA Position Concerning Exchanges of Persons
and Travel to the USSR, 23 September 1955

1. Annex "B" of the referenced draft should contain several exchanges of persons in fields related to the Geographic Area's interest. The following possible exchanges are listed under two main headings as found in Annex "B". The two headings are: Areas of Probable Net U. S. Advantage and Areas of Probable Net Soviet Advantage.

2. Areas of Probable Net U. S. Advantage

a. Mapping and charting, including large-scale topographic mapping, aeronautical and hydrographic charting, the prime interest of the U. S. would be an examination of the accomplishments and program of the GUK- Chief Administration, Geography and Cartography, and the VTU-Military Topographic Administration. Since it is our belief that the Soviets have collected large numbers of large-scale maps and charts and know to a considerable extent the map program of the U. S., it would be to our advantage to gain whatever insight it is possible into the plans and programs of the above two organizations and to obtain large-scale maps of the Soviet Union.

b. Photographic Interpretation to include U. S. visits to Aero-Geodetic establishments, the Military Engineering Academy, the Officers Surveying and Mapping School in Leningrad, the Moscow and Novosibirsk Institute of Engineers of Geodesy, Photogrammetry and Cartography, and the Institute of Land Utilization in Moscow. Many of the technical advances made in the field of photo interpretation and photogrammetry and the U. S. have been fully reported in technical manuals and are undoubtedly in the hands of the Soviets. Similarly, the Soviets have been able to observe the application of photographic interpretation to problems of reclamation, power development, city planning, geologic and soils work in the U. S. Our information on Soviet activities and advancement in these fields is relatively sketchy, and it would be to our net advantage to thoroughly investigate Soviet technical achievements, instrumentation and the application of photographic interpretation and photogrammetry.

DOCUMENT NO. 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ✓
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 1989
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1989
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 1/11/79 REVIEWER: 372044

c. City planning work in the U. S. is open to full examination, whereas our knowledge of city planning in the Soviet Union is rather meager. A visit to the cities of U. S. intelligence interest could be very profitable.

d. Geological research and exploration. U. S. work and the publication of it in this field has been available for many years. The interest of the intelligence community would be in the application of Soviet geological research and field exploration to the further development of economic capabilities within certain regions of the USSR. It would be to our net advantage to participate in an exchange in this field.

e. Soils research and mapping would provide similar opportunities for examination of scientific work related to agricultural development and other land planning activities within the Soviet Union.

f. Land reclamation activities would provide an excellent vehicle for examination of wide areas in the Soviet Union and would prove to be a net advantage in view of the well publicized land reclamation activities in the U. S. This would also hold true for power development and land management activities.

3. Areas of Probable Net Soviet Advantage

In listing mapping and charting and photographic interpretation as areas of probable net U. S. advantage, it must be realized that a carefully controlled tour of U. S. facilities which appear to be as open as those accessible to U. S. teams in the USSR must be established in order to assure a net U. S. advantage. Since many of the USSR mapping activities are under strict security controls, it is somewhat doubtful that the key facilities in which we are interested would be accessible to us. Therefore, anything less than a fairly comprehensive look at these activities on our part might well prove to be a probable net Soviet advantage.

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